Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Committee

California Senate Bill 414

Assessment of Emergency Towing Capabilities in the Port Hueneme Area of Responsibility

1/19/22

Final Report
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Part I. Introduction/Background

California Senate Bill 414 (SB 414) was signed into law by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and became effective January 1, 2016. The bill requires, *inter alia*, the Administrator of the Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to task the Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Committee (PH HSC):

“... to assess the presence and capability of tugs within their respective geographic area of responsibility to provide emergency towing of tank and non-tank vessels to arrest their drift or otherwise guide emergency transit.”

The assessment must take into consideration data from United States Coast Guard (USCG), relevant incident and accident data, simulation models, and identification of transit areas where risks might be elevated. In addition, the assessment must consider the condition of tank and non-tank vessels calling on Port Hueneme, including the USCG’s Marine Inspection Program and Port State Control Program. See Appendix A for the complete text of SB 414.

On February 8th, 2018, OSPR Administrator Thomas M. Cullen, Jr. sent a letter to the PH HSC Chair Chuck Caulkins providing further guidance and support for the assessment. Specifically, the letter clarified the scope of the assessment to vessels over 300 GRT, required the assessment for Port Hueneme to be initiated by January 2020, and offered financial assistance if needed to complete the tasking. Upon completion, the assessment is to be reported in the Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Plan. See Appendix B for the letter from the OSPR Administrator.

At the May 13th, 2018 meeting of the PH HSC, Chair Caulkins informed the group that SB 414 had passed into law and that the PH HSC should begin gathering information on its assessment. At its May 2, 2019 meeting, the PH HSC again reviewed the mandate of SB 414 and formalized a SB 414 Workgroup (“Workgroup”). See Appendix C for a roster of Workgroup participants. The Workgroup identified the core issues raised by SB 414 as follows:

- Identify the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) for the assessment,
- Determine what it means to “arrest the drift or otherwise guide emergency transit,”
- Identify the current inventory of available tug assets in the AOR,
- Assess the capabilities and limitations of available tug assets in the AOR,
- Determine tug asset response times in the AOR,
- Identify any transit areas of concern in the AOR,
• Gather relevant incident and accident data,
• Analyze information from the USCG’s Port State Control Program and Marine Inspection Program to assess the condition of the tank and non-tank vessels calling on Port Hueneme.

On May 2nd, 2019, the Workgroup initiated their data collection tasks and agreed to report back to the larger PH HSC on a regular basis.

The primary focus of this study is to assess response tug capability. At the outset, the Workgroup acknowledged that many varied factors affect this analysis. For example, severe weather in the offshore waters can increase overall risk by increasing a disabled vessel’s drift rate, decreasing a response tug’s speed (thus increasing its run-time), and hampering a response crew’s ability to connect towing equipment to a disabled vessel. In addition, there are oftentimes opportunities to reduce risk by controlling or influencing the drift of a disabled vessel in a manner that affords additional time for response assets to arrive on scene. Ships’ crews can use bow thrusters or partially functioning engines to reduce their vessel’s drift rate or alter its drift direction. Should the vessel drift nearer to shore (and into more shallow waters), it may be possible to deploy the disabled ship’s anchor(s) and arrest its drift before it goes aground.

When assessing hypothetical failure scenarios absolute conclusions are not likely. Nonetheless, a qualitative analysis of the likelihood and potential consequence related to a hypothetical occurrence can be achieved. Toward that end, clearly defining the scope for this study will focus our analysis and facilitate more reliable conclusions.

**Part II. Scope of Study**

The PH HSC was tasked with assessing “the presence and capability of tugs within its geographic area of responsibility.” In assessing the capability of tugs to respond to a disabled vessel in the offshore waters of Port Hueneme, the Workgroup followed guidance from the OSPR Administrator and limited its study to vessels 300 gross tons and larger. This category generally includes vessels of the following types: Oil Tankers, Chemical Tankers, Container Ships, Vehicle Carriers, General Cargo/Multi-Purpose Ships, Bulk Carriers, Barges and Articulated Tug/Barge Units, Ro-Ro Cargo Ships, Refrigerated Cargo Carriers, and Heavy Lift Ships.
Geographic Area of Responsibility

Defining the geographic limits of the study area is a critical threshold issue. SB 414 requires the PH HSC “... to assess the presence and capability of tugs within their respective geographic area of responsibility...”. For guidance, the Workgroup looked to the Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Plan. In the Harbor Safety Plan, the PH HSC geographic area of responsibility (AOR) is defined as follows:

The geographic areas of concern for the Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Plan are the waters of Port Hueneme Harbor, and the area included within an area bounded by a line drawn from the West Jetty Light to; 34-09N, 119-15W; 34-08N, 119-16W; 34-07N, 119-16W; 34-06N, 119-14W; 34-06N, 119-11W; 34-07N, 119-11W; to the East Jetty Light.

The Workgroup acknowledges the importance of coordinating its assessment with the efforts of the other California HSC’s, notably with the concurrent Humboldt Bay assessment and the already completed assessments of San Diego, Los Angeles/Long Beach, and San Francisco. The PH AOR should not extend so far as to overlap with the other ports’ responsibility areas. Conversely, there is a significant advantage associated with communication and data sharing between HSC’s.

For these reasons, the Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Committee concludes that the geographic AOR for this study should match the Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Plan AOR. See graphic depiction below.
**Arrest Drift of otherwise Guide Emergency Transit**

For the purposes of this study, the Workgroup interprets the term “arrest their drift or otherwise guide emergency transit” as the ability to use tugs and/or ship’s anchors to hold a disabled vessel in position, slow its drift rate to afford more time for additional resources to arrive on scene, alter its direction of drift to avoid grounding, or any combination of the above. This definition includes using response tugs to push/pull/nudge/guide a vessel to influence its direction of drift sufficiently so that it avoids drifting ashore, even though the disabled vessel may still be moving. This definition also includes using the disabled vessel’s anchors, where possible, to arrest its drift and prevent grounding. The overarching objective of “arresting their drift or otherwise guiding emergency transit” is to prevent a vessel from grounding. This analysis does not apply beyond the point where sufficient towing assets have arrived on scene to stabilize the emergency. Additional resources may be needed to safely direct the vessel to a harbor of safe refuge or safe anchorage, which is beyond the scope of this study.

**Part III. Assessment Considerations/Data Collected/Analysis**

The Workgroup membership is composed of a cross-section of maritime professionals with expertise in a variety of disciplines including vessel operations, piloting, and offshore towing. The Workgroup collected and analyzed a large amount of data to prepare this report, including: a current inventory of available response tugs within the Port Hueneme AOR; past studies and simulation models; incident data over the past seven years; identification of transit areas of concern (e.g., areas that might not offer any suitable anchoring opportunity); and information relating to the USCG’s Port State Control and Marine Inspection Programs.

**Tug Inventory/Capability/Availability**

The Workgroup provided a current inventory of active tugs in the Port Hueneme AOR. The inventory contains information on the name, bollard pull, operational range, weather limits, onboard tow equipment, and the availability of each tug. It should be noted that such an inventory is a “snapshot in time,” since home-port assignments for tugs can change. Nonetheless, this inventory does indicate a current summary of tug assets in Port Hueneme. The Workgroup believes that it is representative of the minimum number of tugs that will continue to be available in the future.
The process of performing a successful rescue of a disabled vessel, whether the goal is to hook up and tow the disabled vessel, or to stabilize the vessel and arrest its drift, is dependent upon a multitude of factors including: the size, horsepower (bollard pull), range, propulsion and presence of standard towing equipment on the rescue tug; the rescue tugs’ availability; the type, size, and condition of the disabled vessel to be rescued; the existing weather and sea conditions; and the urgency of the situation in terms of location and distance from shore.

The Workgroup looked to a comprehensive 2002 Project Report1 that compiled similar data for the entire West Coast and found it instructive in generally evaluating the effectiveness and capability of the current tug inventory. According to that in-depth report, tugs with 40 tons of bollard pull or more would meet the criteria as a “rescue tug” for areas offshore Port Hueneme. The Workgroup considered this information as general guidance but emphasized that bollard pull/horsepower metrics alone were not

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1 West coast offshore vessel traffic risk management project (Final Report, 2002), Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force and the U.S. Coast Guard, Pacific Area.
enough to conclude that the tugs in the PH AOR are both reliable and sufficiently capable of performing a successful rescue of a disabled vessel.

Currently, 3 active ship-assist type tugs are in Port Hueneme with a range of bollard pull capabilities and equipment configurations. Teresa is the strongest tug, with a bollard pull of 61 tons. Simone has a bollard pull of 54.5 tons, and the tug Roland has a bollard pull of 26 tons. The tug Roland, with the least amount of bollard pull, is the only tug in the group equipped with a tow winch (Markey/wire on drum).

After review, the Workgroup determined that the tugs in the current inventory are not suitable for emergency open ocean towing. Their primary role is ship handling within the Port complex, including as tug escorts in the safety fairway between the offshore pilot station and the port entrance. The two tugs with the most bollard pull (Teresa and Simone) do not have tow equipment and are not considered by the Workgroup as adequately equipped. The Workgroup recognizes that although the tugs Teresa and Simone may be able to perform an “arrest or influence” maneuver in an offshore emergency, it is only under the most ideal conditions where this would be possible.

The Workgroup also determined that the availability of tugs in Port Hueneme is limited. The tug Roland is on standby for port-ship assist and is available on 2-day notice. Teresa and Simone are always on contract with the Port. Vessel callout for these tugs generally requires two-hours of advance notice for routine operations. The Workgroup notes that these tugs are primarily dedicated to work within the inner harbor areas of Port Hueneme, but they can be dispatched for rescue work. Local stakeholders understand the importance of rendering aid to a vessel in distress, and local tug operators are prepared to give emergency response the highest priority. While rarely necessitated, tug operators have demonstrated their ability to respond quickly during the few cases when offshore emergencies have arisen. This is evidenced by the most recent incident involving the container ship President Eisenhower, which was intercepted by the tug Teresa while drifting towards the shoreline without power (See incident #3 on pg. 9 of this report for more detail).

Workgroup members representing the tug industry offered that severe weather conditions can limit a response tug’s ability to operate in the offshore environment. More specifically, rough sea conditions might increase transit times and make it more difficult to intercept or connect a towline to a drifting vessel. Two Port Hueneme tugs can operate in up to Beaufort Force 6 conditions (wind 22-27 knots (25-31 m.p.h.), wave height 9.5-13 feet). The tug Roland can operate in up to Beaufort Force 5 conditions.
Some tugs might be able to operate in sea conditions that exceed Beaufort Force 6, but with limitations. When operating in Force 7 or greater, tug companies typically conduct an additional risk assessment to mitigate the hazards associated with severe weather conditions.

Incident Data Collected

The Workgroup assessed relevant vessel incidents that occurred between 2016 and 2021. Based on information reported to the U.S. Coast Guard over a 6-year period, there were 3 incidents relevant to this study. It is important to note that all 3 of these incidents initially occurred outside of the AOR, in mild weather, and each of the ships were safely escorted to a designated anchorage area or into port. The table below summarizes the incidents during the period 2016 - 2021.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Relevant Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of this study, a "relevant incident" is defined as an incident related to propulsion, steering, electrical, or other similar casualty that did or could result in a drifting ship needing tug assistance. This definition strips out cases of fishing and pleasure boats, search and rescue cases, medical evacuations, rules of the road, etc. Reported incidents are typically corrected before the vessel enters port. Of the incidents that cannot be immediately corrected, most do not completely disable the vessel. Despite this, the USCG Captain of the Port will normally place restrictions on the vessel until repairs can be completed and such an order will often include a requirement for tugs to assist.
escort the vessel into port as a precautionary measure. These incidents must be distinguished from those rare incidents wherein a vessel becomes completely disabled and requires an emergency response and direct tow into port.

Incident Summaries

2020 Incident #1 – M/V Sealand Los Angeles

On the afternoon of December 15, 2020, a 685-foot containership lost propulsion approximately 10 miles south of the pilot station while inbound to the Port of Hueneme. The vessel had been approaching the pilot station and was conducting the required pre-arrival checks to machinery and systems when the main engine failed to respond to commands from the bridge. The cause was located, and repairs were made but the vessel was adrift outside of the Port for several hours before regaining power and receiving a pilot for the arrival. Once the pilot had begun the vessel’s entry into the Port, a second loss of propulsion occurred. Two assist tugs were alongside during this loss of propulsion and the arrival was able to be completed with their direct assistance.

2020 Incident #2 – M/V Sealand Manzanillo

On the morning of December 31, 2020, a 685-foot containership lost propulsion while inbound to the Port of Hueneme. As with the previous incident, the vessel had been approaching the pilot station and was conducting pre-arrival checks to machinery and systems when the main engine failed to respond to commands. The vessel drifted toward a safe anchorage area and successfully anchored while the crew investigated the cause, successfully identified the failed components, and made repairs. The vessel remained at anchor for three days until berth space was available, at which time the vessel successfully entered the Port with no further incidents.

2021 Incident #3 – M/V President Eisenhower

On April 28, 2021, a 943-foot container ship reported a fire onboard in their main space while transiting the Santa Barbara Channel from Los Angeles to Oakland. The USCG closely monitored the situation and position of the ship as it drifted in the vicinity of Platform Hondo and Platform Holly. Ultimately, the tug Teresa Brusco from the Port of Hueneme arrived on scene to hold the vessel in safe position until additional tugs arrived to tow her back to the Port of Long Beach for investigation and repair.
In the President Eisenhower incident, mild and calm weather prevented the drift of the vessel from becoming an emergent danger to offshore facilities and the adjacent shoreline. As mentioned previously in this report, it was only because of ideal conditions (both with weather and the condition of the vessel to be rescued) that the tug Teresa Brusco was able to intercept the vessel outside of the AOR and arrest its drift until other more capable tugs arrived on scene. While not implemented, it is possible that the drifting vessel could have dropped its own anchor to arrest its drift and prevent it from running aground. In both 2020 incidents, the ships were near the Pilot Station and the losses of propulsion were due to operation of the engines as the ships arrived at the Port. In both 2020 cases, assist tugs were nearby or already on scene due to the standard procedures and standards of care used for ships arriving at Port Hueneme.

The Port Hueneme HSC concludes that the incidence of vessel failures that necessitate a rescue within the Port Hueneme AOR is extremely low, and that historically these failures have occurred near the Pilot Station where available response tugs routinely work and are close at hand.

Transit Areas of Concern

The Workgroup identified transit areas within the AOR where the grounding risk associated with a drifting vessel could be higher. The Workgroup assessed those circumstances wherein a tug, dispatched from port in an emergency, might not be able to reach a disabled vessel before it grounded within the AOR. The assessment factors included, the disabled vessel’s distance from the grounding line when failure occurred, its drift rate and direction of drift, and the response tug’s “run time” to reach the drifting vessel. Key features in the area, like the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), pilot boarding station, anchorages, and oil Platform Gina were identified as well. In addition, the Workgroup identified the portion of the Hueneme Canyon within the AOR where a drifting vessel might have difficulty deploying its anchor(s) due to deep water prior to drifting ashore. See graphic representation below.
Transit Areas of Concern

PORT OF HUENEME
HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEE AOR

Platform Gina
Pilot Station
Hueneme Canyon

Traffic Separation Scheme

FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY
Run Time

According to Workgroup, the available PH tugs should be able to make at least a 10 knot (11.5 m.p.h.) speed of advance while operating within the PH AOR, however response speeds could be slower based on weather and sea conditions at the time of a response. It is estimated that it would take 30-minutes for a PH tug to reach the western (furthest seaward) boundary of the PH AOR. Additionally, the Workgroup assumed that the worst-case drift scenario for a disabled vessel would be 3 knots (3.4 m.p.h.). Given the relatively quick speeds of available tugs, combined with the short distance to the outer geographical boundaries of the AOR, the Workgroup finds that it is likely that a PH tug would be able to reach any vessel that becomes disabled while traveling through or in close proximity to the PH AOR.

Traffic Separation Scheme/Pilot Station

The normal transit areas for all vessels over 300 gross tons are the IMO Approved Traffic Lanes and the locally recommended Western Voluntary Traffic Lanes (collectively referred to as the Traffic Separation Scheme or TSS). Although the traffic lanes themselves are outside of the geographical scope of this study, it is important to note the higher traffic densities in the area, as well as the fact that large deep draft ships subject to this study may be approaching the Pilot Station and conducting their pre-arrival checks (steering and propulsion systems, etc.). Vessels transiting through the TSS, and by extension to the Pilot Station for a tug escort into Port, are within the range of tugs dispatched from Port Hueneme. Accordingly, a vessel utilizing the TSS/Pilot Station and subsequently becoming disabled poses little concern of grounding within the AOR. See Transit Areas of Concern Graphic on pg. 11.

Hueneme Canyon

As mentioned, a disabled and unreachable vessel drifting without tug assistance may be able to arrest its drift by dropping its anchor(s). Thus, the risks associated with grounding can be eliminated when a drifting vessel has sufficient opportunity to deploy its anchors prior to grounding, with or without tug assistance. However, this methodology is only available once the vessel drifts into waters sufficiently shallow to allow anchoring, which is usually relatively near the shore. In areas where shallow water

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2 West coast offshore vessel traffic risk management project (Final Report, 2002), Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force and the U.S. Coast Guard, Pacific Area.
extends sufficiently far from shore, the risk of grounding is very low. In areas where there is deep water in close proximity to shore, the risk of grounding is higher. Accepted industry practices indicate that the recommended maximum depth for anchoring a drifting ship is approximately 50 fathoms (300 feet).³

The Workgroup identified Hueneme Canyon (the portion within the AOR) where water depths exceeding 50 fathoms are close inshore such that a drifting vessel might have difficulty deploying its anchors prior to grounding. However, the Workgroup finds that Hueneme Canyon does not rise to the level of being classified as an area of concern because there is shallow water on either side of the canyon (north and south) with ample space to drop anchor. Moreover, the Hueneme Canyon follows the direction of the PH Safety Fairway into the port entrance where assist tugs are routinely working. See Transit Areas of Concern Graphic on pg. 11.

Platform Gina and Underwater Pipeline

The Workgroup identified oil platform Gina and its pipeline to shore as a possible transit area of concern, due to the possibility of a drifting vessel colliding with it and/or its associated infrastructure. Even though platform Gina and its pipeline are located outside of AOR, the Workgroup believes the features should be noted in this report. The committee highlights that the underwater oil pipeline is in the vicinity of the northern AOR boundary. In an extremis anchoring event, the pipeline should be identified and avoided. Because Gina and its associated oil pipeline to shore are located outside of the geographical scope of this study, it was not deemed a transit area of concern for the purposes of this report. See Transit Areas of Concern Graphic on pg. 11.

The PH HSC concludes that the TSS, and by extension the Pilot Station and safety fairway through which deep draft vessel traffic into Port Hueneme flows, are not areas of concern. It is likely that an on-scene tug would be able to reach any vessel that becomes disabled while traveling through these areas. This is due to a sufficiency of drift distance from shore, combined with expected response tug transit times, and/or ample opportunity to anchor a drifting vessel prior to reaching shore.

Assessment of United States Coast Guard’s Port State Control and Marine Inspection Programs

SB 414 requires the review of the USCG’s Marine Inspection Program and Port State Control Program (PSC) regarding risks due to a vessel’s hull or engineering material deficiencies, or inadequate crew training and professionalism. The Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Committee is following the Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor Safety Committee and the Harbor Safety Committee of the San Francisco Bay Region’s innovative and streamlined approach to assess the condition of the USCG’s PSC program. The committees recognized a worldwide network of PSC regimes exist with the goal to eliminate substandard shipping. The USCG holds observer status within both the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo MoU) and Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU). Similarly, the Tokyo MoU has granted observer status to the Paris MoU, and the Paris MOU has granted observer status to the Tokyo MoU. The Paris MoU, Tokyo MOU and the USCG each produced an annual PSC report, and these reports list the vessel Detention Rate due to unsatisfactory Safety Examination results. The USCG’s annual reports also list the Detention Rate for California, known as District 11’s Detention Rate.

The HSCs reviewed six years (2010 - 2015) of data published in annual reports from the Paris MoU’s, Tokyo MoU and USCG. This assessment encompassed PSC data from forty-five countries on five continents, 651,134 PSC vessel boardings, 350,943 Safety Examinations and 12,991 Detentions.

Utilizing the Detention Rate derived from PSC data, the HSCs were able to quantify the quality of vessels calling on California ports by comparing the California Vessel Detention Rate weighted average against the combined PSC authorities’ detention rate weighted average. Using the California Vessel Detention Rate in this way enables for the relative assessment as to the condition/quality of vessels calling on California ports.

The assessments results were definitive and conclusive. The California Vessel Detention Rate weighted average at 0.0064% is the lowest of all surveyed PSC organizations. It indicates vessels calling on California are 99.84% less likely to possess the characteristics that would warrant a PSC detention than other parts of the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSC Authority</th>
<th>No. of Safety Examinations</th>
<th>No. of Detentions</th>
<th>Detention Rate % Based on Detentions*</th>
<th>Weighting % (Detention Rate % x Weight)</th>
<th>Detention Rate Weighted Average**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(E)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(C) / (B)</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokyo MoU</td>
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<td>8,145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paris MoU</td>
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<td>4,022</td>
<td>3.4853%</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG less D 11</td>
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<td>749</td>
<td>1.4794%</td>
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<tr>
<td>D11 (CVDR)</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>1.1067%</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>350,943</td>
<td>12,991</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSC Detention Rate Weighted Average (W.A) 4.0374%
CVDR W.A. 0.0064%
CVDR W.A. Below PSC Detention Rate W.A. 4.0309%
Percent CVDR W.A. is below PSC Detention Rate W.A. -99.84%***

Notes:
* Calculation is Number of Detentions by a PSC divided by the sum of all PSC Detentions (12,991)
** Calculation is Detention Rate % multiplied by the Weighting %
*** Calculation is 4.0374% less 0.0064% divided by 4.0374%

**U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Inspection Program (U.S. Flag Vessels)** – Published each year in the Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU Annual Reports, is an updated document entitled, “White, Grey and Black (WGB) List.” The WGB List represents the full spectrum, from quality flag states to flag states with a poor performance that are considered high risk. It is based on the total number of inspections and detentions and is the results from PSC inspections. The WGB List reflects the quality of a flag state’s (marine) inspection program as well as the quality of vessels and vessel operators.

The White List contains a list of flag states found to be of higher quality and lower risk. Conversely, the Black List contains a list of flag states found to be substandard and of higher risk. The Gray List is a list of flag states that may be simply described as average, average being considered less than ideal.

Independent third party audits, more commonly referred to as PSC inspections, over the last six consecutive years have reflected favorably upon the flag state of United States as well as the condition of the USCG’s Marine Inspection Program. During the sample period (2010-2015), the flag state of United States attained White List, low risk status 83% of the time. Moreover, over the past four consecutive years (2012-2015), the flag state United States attained White List, low risk status 100% of the time.

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Accordingly, the Port Hueneme HSC finds the condition of United States vessels 300 GRT and greater and the condition of the USCG’s Marine Inspection Program to be adequate.

Part IV. Conclusions

There are many factors that could cause a vessel to lose propulsion and/or maneuverability. However, based on the data assembled in response to Senate Bill 414, Port Hueneme is prepared for most foreseeable emergency scenarios that might require a tug to assist a 300 GRT vessel to arrest its drift or otherwise guide its emergency transit in the AOR. Even with the limited presence and capability of ocean towing tugs in Port Hueneme, it is likely that an assist tug will arrive on scene before a disabled vessel traveling in the PH AOR could drift into danger and become grounded. As noted in this report, there is ample shallow water space within the boundaries of the AOR for anchoring if necessary. There have been very few vessel failures that have necessitated an emergency tow or assist in the AOR, and each of them occurred relatively near to the pilot boarding station and port entrance where tug assets are always close at hand. No transit areas of concern were identified in the PH AOR. The quality of the vessels and crews calling Port Hueneme and other California ports is generally very high as indicated by reliable data from the annual reports of the USCG’s Port State Control Program, the Tokyo MoU, and the Paris MoU.

Historically, when vessels have experienced failures in the PH AOR, they have had sufficient sea room to drift until propulsion was restored or tugs arrived on scene to intercept or escort the vessel to safety. The worst-case scenario identified by the PH HSC would be for a vessel to experience a disabling failure while traveling in bad weather outside of the PH AOR, where a tug dispatched in an emergency might not be able to reach the disabled vessel before it grounded. The Workgroup notes that there is a significant geographical distance between the AOR’s studied under SB 414 where gaps in coverage may exist due to the lack of readily available severe weather response tugs. Although the risk is low due to the unlikely confluence of events necessary to drive a disabled deep draft vessel ashore, the Workgroup nevertheless has considered the following recommendation:

- Recommend that steps be taken to raise awareness of the grounding risks associated with vessels over 300 gross tons transiting outside of the PH AOR, where gaps in adequate response coverage may exist due to a lack of readily available severe weather response tugs.
Finding: The Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Committee finds that the assist tugs presently in place in Port Hueneme are sufficient to arrest the drift of a disabled vessel or otherwise influence its drift to prevent it from grounding within the AOR.
CHAPTER 609

An act to amend Sections 8670.12, 8670.13, 8670.28, and 8670.67.5 of, and to add Sections 8670.11, 8670.13.3, and 8670.55.1 to, the Government Code, relating to oil spill response.

[Approved by Governor October 08, 2015.
File with Secretary of State October 08, 2015.]

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST

SB 414, Jackson. Oil spill response.

(1) The Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act generally requires the administrator for oil spill response, acting at the direction of the Governor, to implement activities relating to oil spill response, including emergency drills and preparedness, and oil spill containment and cleanup. The act authorizes the administrator to use volunteer workers in response, containment, restoration, wildlife rehabilitation, and cleanup efforts for oil spills in waters of the state. Existing law requires the administrator to evaluate the feasibility of using commercial fishermen and other mariners for oil spill containment and cleanup.

This bill would require the administrator, in cooperation with the United States Coast Guard, to establish a schedule of drills and exercises that are required under the federal Salvage and Marine Firefighting regulations. The bill would require the administrator to direct the Harbor Safety Committees for various regions to assess, among other things, the presence and capability of tugs within their respective regions of responsibility to provide emergency towing of tank and nontank vessels to arrest their drift or guide emergency transit.

(2) The act requires the administrator to study the use and effects of methods used to respond to oil spills and to periodically update the study to ensure the best achievable protection from the use of those methods.

This bill would require the administrator, in conducting the study and updates, to consult current peer-reviewed published scientific literature. The bill would require the administrator, by May 1, 2016, to request that the federal California Dispersant Plan be updated, as provided, and to provide support and assistance in that regard.

(3) The act requires the administrator to license oil spill cleanup agents for use in response to oil spills.

This bill would require the administrator, if dispersants are used in response to an oil spill, to submit to the Legislature a written notification of, and a written justification for, the use of dispersants and a report on the effectiveness of the dispersants used, as provided.

(4) Existing law establishes the Oil Spill Technical Advisory Committee and requires the committee to provide recommendations to, among other entities, the administrator on the implementation of the act.
This bill would require the committee to convene a taskforce to evaluate the feasibility of using vessels of opportunity for oil spill response. The bill would require the taskforce to provide recommendations to the administrator and the Legislature on whether vessels of opportunity should be included in oil spill response planning.

(5) The act makes a person who causes or permits a spill or inland spill strictly liable for specified penalties for the spill on a per-gallon-released basis. The act provides that the amount of penalty is reduced by the amount of released oil that is recovered and properly disposed of.

This bill would eliminate that reduction in the penalty by the amount of oil recovered and properly disposed of.

DIGEST KEY

Vote: majority   Appropriation: no   Fiscal Committee: yes   Local Program: no

BILL TEXT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. Section 8670.11 is added to the Government Code, to read:

8670.11. In addition to Section 8670.10, the administrator, in cooperation with the United States Coast Guard, shall establish a schedule of drills and exercises required pursuant to Section 155.4052 of Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The administrator shall make publicly available the established schedule.

SEC. 2. Section 8670.12 of the Government Code is amended to read:

8670.12. (a) The administrator shall conduct studies and evaluations necessary for improving oil spill response, containment, and cleanup and oil spill wildlife rehabilitation in waters of the state and oil transportation systems. The administrator may expend moneys from the Oil Spill Prevention and Administration Fund created pursuant to Section 8670.38, enter into consultation agreements, and acquire necessary equipment and services for the purpose of carrying out these studies and evaluations.

(b) The administrator shall, consulting current peer-reviewed published scientific literature, study the use and effects of dispersants, incineration, bioremediation, and any other methods used to respond to a spill and, by May 1, 2016, request that the federal California Dispersant Plan be updated pursuant to subdivision (d). The study shall periodically be updated by the administrator, consulting current peer-reviewed published scientific literature, to ensure the best achievable protection from the use of those methods. Based upon substantial evidence in the record, the administrator may determine in individual cases that best achievable protection is provided by establishing requirements that provide the greatest degree of protection achievable without imposing costs that significantly outweigh the incremental protection that would otherwise be provided. The studies shall do all of the following:

(1) Evaluate the effectiveness of dispersants and other chemical, bioremediation, and biological agents in oil spill response under varying environmental conditions.
(2) Evaluate potential adverse impacts on the environment and public health including, but not limited to, adverse toxic impacts on water quality, fisheries, and wildlife with consideration to bioaccumulation and synergistic impacts, and the potential for human exposure, including skin contact and consumption of contaminated seafood.

(3) Recommend appropriate uses and limitations on the use of dispersants and other chemical, bioremediation, and biological agents to ensure they are used only in situations where the administrator determines they are effective and safe.

c The studies shall be performed with consideration of current peer-reviewed published scientific literature and any studies performed by federal, state, and international entities. The administrator may enter into contracts for the studies.

d The administrator shall support the federal Regional Response Team, as described in Section 300.115 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, in the development, and shall request regular updates, of plans and procedures for use of dispersants and other chemical agents in California. The administrator’s assistance may include, but is not limited to, providing the federal Regional Response Team with current peer-reviewed published scientific literature, and risk and consequence analysis.

SEC. 3. Section 8670.13 of the Government Code is amended to read:

8670.13. (a) The administrator shall periodically evaluate the feasibility of requiring new technologies to aid prevention, response, containment, cleanup, and wildlife rehabilitation.

(b) (1) On or before January 1, 2017, the administrator shall submit a report to the Legislature, pursuant to Section 9795, assessing the best achievable technology of equipment for oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response.

(2) The report shall evaluate studies of estimated recovery system potential as a methodology for rating equipment in comparison to effective daily recovery capacity.

(3) Pursuant to Section 10231.5, this subdivision is inoperative on July 1, 2020.

(c) (1) Including, but not limited to, the report prepared pursuant to subdivision (b), the administrator shall update regulations governing the adequacy of oil spill contingency plans for best achievable technologies for oil spill prevention and response no later than July 1, 2018.

(2) The updated regulations shall enhance the capabilities for prevention, response, containment, cleanup, and wildlife rehabilitation.

(d) (1) The administrator shall direct the Harbor Safety Committees, established pursuant to Section 8670.23, to assess the presence and capability of tugs within their respective geographic areas of responsibility to provide emergency towing of tank vessels and nontank vessels to arrest their drift or otherwise guide emergency transit.

(2) The assessments for harbors in the San Francisco Bay area and in Los Angeles-Long Beach area shall be initiated by May 1, 2016. The assessments for the other harbors shall be initiated by January 1, 2020.

(3) The assessment shall consider, but not be limited to, data from available United States Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Systems, relevant incident and accident data, any relevant simulation models, and identification of any transit areas where risks are higher.

(4) The assessment shall consider the condition of tank and nontank vessels calling on harbors, including
the United States Coast Guard’s marine inspection program and port state control program regarding risks due to a vessel’s hull or engineering material deficiencies, or inadequate crew training and professionalism.

SEC. 4. Section 8670.13.3 is added to the Government Code, to read:

8670.13.3. If dispersants are used in response to an oil spill in state waters, the administrator shall provide written notification of their use to the Legislature within three days of the use. The administrator shall provide the Legislature with written justification of their use, including copies of key supporting documentation used by the federal on-scene coordinator and the federal Regional Response Team as soon as those material are released. Within two months of the use of dispersants in state waters, the administrator shall also provide a report to the Legislature on the effectiveness of the dispersants used, including, but not limited to, results of any available monitoring data to determine whether the dispersant use resulted in overall environmental benefit or harm. The written notification, justification, and report shall be submitted pursuant to Section 9795.

SEC. 5. Section 8670.28 of the Government Code is amended to read:

8670.28. (a) The administrator, taking into consideration the facility or vessel contingency plan requirements of the State Lands Commission, the Office of the State Fire Marshal, the California Coastal Commission, and other state and federal agencies, shall adopt and implement regulations governing the adequacy of oil spill contingency plans to be prepared and implemented under this article. All regulations shall be developed in consultation with the Oil Spill Technical Advisory Committee, and shall be consistent with the California oil spill contingency plan and not in conflict with the National Contingency Plan. The regulations shall provide for the best achievable protection of waters and natural resources of the state. The regulations shall permit the development, application, and use of an oil spill contingency plan for similar vessels, pipelines, terminals, and facilities within a single company or organization, and across companies and organizations. The regulations shall, at a minimum, ensure all of the following:

(1) All areas of state waters are at all times protected by prevention, response, containment, and cleanup equipment and operations.

(2) Standards set for response, containment, and cleanup equipment and operations are maintained and regularly improved to protect the resources of the state.

(3) All appropriate personnel employed by operators required to have a contingency plan receive training in oil spill response and cleanup equipment usage and operations.

(4) Each oil spill contingency plan provides for appropriate financial or contractual arrangements for all necessary equipment and services for the response, containment, and cleanup of a reasonable worst case oil spill scenario for each area the plan addresses.

(5) Each oil spill contingency plan demonstrates that all protection measures are being taken to reduce the possibility of an oil spill occurring as a result of the operation of the facility or vessel. The protection measures shall include, but not be limited to, response to disabled vessels and an identification of those measures taken to comply with requirements of Division 7.8 (commencing with Section 8750) of the Public Resources Code.
(6) Each oil spill contingency plan identifies the types of equipment that can be used, the location of the equipment, and the time taken to deliver the equipment.

(7) Each facility, as determined by the administrator, conducts a hazard and operability study to identify the hazards associated with the operation of the facility, including the use of the facility by vessels, due to operating error, equipment failure, and external events. For the hazards identified in the hazard and operability studies, the facility shall conduct an offsite consequence analysis that, for the most likely hazards, assumes pessimistic water and air dispersion and other adverse environmental conditions.

(8) Each oil spill contingency plan contains a list of contacts to call in the event of a drill, threatened discharge of oil, or discharge of oil.

(9) Each oil spill contingency plan identifies the measures to be taken to protect the recreational and environmentally sensitive areas that would be threatened by a reasonable worst case oil spill scenario.

(10) Standards for determining a reasonable worst case oil spill. However, for a nontank vessel, the reasonable worst case is a spill of the total volume of the largest fuel tank on the nontank vessel.

(11) Each oil spill contingency plan specifies an agent for service of process. The agent shall be located in this state.

(b) The regulations and guidelines adopted pursuant to this section shall also include provisions to provide public review and comment on submitted oil spill contingency plans.

(c) The regulations adopted pursuant to this section shall specifically address the types of equipment that will be necessary, the maximum time that will be allowed for deployment, the maximum distance to cooperating response entities, the amounts of dispersant, and the maximum time required for application, should the use of dispersants be approved. Upon a determination by the administrator that booming is appropriate at the site and necessary to provide best achievable protection, the regulations shall require that vessels engaged in lightering operations be boomed prior to the commencement of operations.

(d) The administrator shall adopt regulations and guidelines for oil spill contingency plans with regard to mobile transfer units, small marine fueling facilities, and vessels carrying oil as secondary cargo that acknowledge the reduced risk of damage from oil spills from those units, facilities, and vessels while maintaining the best achievable protection for the public health and safety and the environment.

SEC. 6. Section 8670.55.1 is added to the Government Code, to read:

8670.55.1. (a) The committee shall convene a taskforce, including appropriate state and federal governmental representatives, nongovernmental organizations, oil spill response organizations, and commercial fishing and other potential vessels of opportunity, to evaluate and make recommendations regarding the feasibility of using vessels of opportunity for oil spill response in marine waters. The evaluation shall examine the following:

(1) Appropriate functions of vessels of opportunity during an oil spill.

(2) Appropriate management of a vessel’s of opportunity spill response program.

(3) Vessels of opportunity equipment, training, and technology needs.

(4) Liability and insurance.
(5) Compensation.

(b) As part of the evaluation, the taskforce shall hold two public meetings, one in southern California and one in northern California, prior to making final recommendations.

(c) (1) On or before January 1, 2017, the committee shall provide to the administrator and to the Legislature final recommendations on whether vessels of opportunity should be included in oil spill response planning.

(2) The recommendations provided to the Legislature shall be provided pursuant to Section 9795.

(d) If appropriate, the administrator, by January 1, 2018, shall update regulations to provide for inclusion of vessels of opportunity in the oil spill prevention, response, and preparedness program.

SEC. 7. Section 8670.67.5 of the Government Code is amended to read:

8670.67.5. (a) Regardless of intent or negligence, any person who causes or permits a spill shall be strictly liable civilly in accordance with subdivision (b) or (c).

(b) A penalty may be administratively imposed by the administrator in accordance with Section 8670.68 in an amount not to exceed twenty dollars ($20) per gallon for a spill.

(c) Whenever the release of oil resulted from gross negligence or reckless conduct, the administrator shall, in accordance with Section 8670.68, impose a penalty in an amount not to exceed sixty dollars ($60) per gallon for a spill.
### Appendix B – Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Committee SB 414 Workgroup Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Bishop</td>
<td>CA Coastal Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuck Caulkins</td>
<td>Cargo Vessel Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT Joe Pricelarson</td>
<td>USCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Fullilove</td>
<td>Tug Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Ireland</td>
<td>Pilots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Edwards</td>
<td>Pilots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Andrew Harvey</td>
<td>Pleasure Boat Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina Birdsey</td>
<td>Port Hueneme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Acknowledgments

The PH HSC SB 414 Workgroup would like to acknowledge these people for their contributions to this report:

- Kip Loutit – Marine Exchange LA/LB
- Ann Kinner – Chair, San Diego HSC
- Lynn Korwatch – Chair, San Francisco/Bay Delta HSC
- James Behrens – Scripps Research Institute
February 8, 2016

Mr. Charles B. Caulkins
Chair
Port Hueneme Harbor Safety Committee
Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc.
Dock 1, Berth 3
Post Office Box 520
Port Hueneme, California 93041

Dear Mr. Caulkins,

Senate Bill 414 signed into law by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., became effective January 1, 2016. This bill requires me to exercise my authority pursuant to Government Code 8670.23.1(g), and task your Harbor Safety Committee with the following:

- Assess the presence and capability of tugs within your respective geographic areas of responsibility to provide emergency towing of vessels over 300 GRT to arrest their drift or otherwise guide emergency transit in the event of a loss of propulsion or steering.

- The assessment for the Port of Hueneme area shall be initiated by January 2020.

- The assessment shall consider, but not be limited to, data from available United States Coast Guard, relevant incident and accident data, any relevant simulation models, and identification of any transit areas where risks are higher.

- The assessment shall consider the condition of tank and non-tank vessels calling on the harbor, including the United States Coast Guard’s marine inspection program and port state control program regarding risks due to a vessel’s hull or engineering material deficiencies, or inadequate crew training and professionalism.

My project officer for this assessment is Oil Spill Prevention Specialist Mr. David Mighetto who may be contacted by e-mail at David.mighetto@wildlife.ca.gov or by phone at 1-916-445-3157. Questions regarding the appropriateness of any assessment model or report format may be directed to Mr. Mighetto or to my Prevention Branch Chief, Mr. Ted Mar, reachable by email at Ted.Mar@wildlife.ca.gov or by phone at 1-916-323-6281.

The assessment should be completed on the committee’s established schedule and reported in your Harbor Safety Plan in June of the finished year. If additional funding is required to complete this tasking, the amount and justification should be submitted to the project officer.

As always, I appreciate your committee’s efforts. I look forward to reading the results of your study.

Sincerely,

Thomas M. Cullen, Jr.
Administrator
Office of Spill Prevention and Response

Conserving California’s Wildlife Since 1870
Overview

California Senate Bill 414 (SB 414) requires Harbor Safety Committees to assess the condition of vessels over 300 GRT calling on California (CA) ports. Additionally, assess the condition of the United States Coast Guard’s (USCG) marine inspection program and port state control (PSC) program regarding risks due to hull or engineering material deficiencies, or inadequate crew training and professionalism.

Background

A Harbor Safety Committee is comprised of a diverse group of port stakeholders including both commercial and recreational waterway users, regulatory authorities, organized labor, and non-governmental environmental organizations. Though the Harbor Safety Committee is arguably the most comprehensive organization on a wide range of maritime related topics, many committee members believe assessing the condition of vessel’s calling on California ports, and to assess the condition of the USCG’s marine inspection and port state control programs, is beyond the level of the committee’s expertise.

Few organizations possess the resources, and maritime expertise to properly conduct an assessment of federal programs as required by SB 414. In matters relating to the effectiveness of federal programs, the United States Governmental Accountability Office is often the organization called upon to objectively assess a federal agency. However, the Los Angeles-Long Beach and the Harbor Safety Committee of the San Francisco Bay Region (HSCs) employed an innovative and streamlined approach to systematically meet the SB 414 mandates by comparing PSC regimes’ data.

Assessment – U.S.C.G.’s Port State Control Program and Foreign Flag Vessels

Currently, a worldwide network of regional co-operation PSC ministries exists with the objective to eliminate substandard shipping. There are a total of nine regional PSC agreements / Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) to include: Abuja MoU, Black Sea MoU, Caribbean MoU, Indian Ocean MoU, Mediterranean MoU, Paris MoU, Riyadh MoU, Tokyo MoU, and Vina del Mar Agreement.5

The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo MoU) and Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) established and maintain effective and close co-operation both at the administrative and technical levels. Representatives of the two Secretariats attend the Port State Control Committee meetings of each MoU on a regular basis and the USCG holds observer status within both of these two organizations.6

For this assessment, the Tokyo MoU, Paris MoU and United States Coast Guard, will be referred to as PSC regimes and only data provided from these three organizations will be referenced. The close cooperative relationship between the USCG, the Tokyo MoU and the Paris MoU facilitates uniform and trackable data values.

6 Ibid.
Appendix D – United States Coast Guard’s Port State Control and Marine Inspection Programs’ Data and Detailed Report

PSC regimes including the USCG have established a vessel targeting matrix to rationally and systematically determine the probable risk posed by foreign flag ships. In developing their risk assessment methodology, the PSC regimes recognize there are key, trackable and quantifiable data points that are often a reflection of a vessel’s operational condition and compliance with international safety and environmental protection standards.7

Three primary factors or data points a PSC’s targeting matrix utilize include: Ship Management Company, Recognized Organizations (Classification Societies), and the Flag State of a ship. Secondary trackable and quantifiable data points include ship type, ship age as well as a PSC’s previous experience/issues with a particular ship.8 9

If a PSC’s targeting matrix identifies a ship of potential higher risk, and a subsequent Safety Examination determined the ship is substandard, a detention of the ship may be ordered by the PSC. “Ships are detained when the condition of the ship or its crew does not correspond substantially with the applicable conventions. Such strong action is to ensure that the ship cannot sail until it can proceed to sea without presenting a danger to the ship or persons on board, or without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.”10

Amongst the list of PSC detainable deficiencies are hull and engineering material deficiencies, inadequate crew training, and professionalism. Vessel detentions thus provide for a key and universal trackable data point to meet the requirements of SB 414.

Methodology

The HSCs sought to determine the quality of vessels calling on California ports by identifying the rate that vessels were being detained by the USCG. Additionally, determine if the detention rate in California was higher or lower than the rate of all vessels being detained in other parts of the United States/word.

The HSCs reviewed six years of data published in the PSC regimes’ annual reports from 2010 to 2015. This assessment will show the California Vessel Detention Rate (CVDR) as compared with the combined six year average Detention Rate as detailed the annual reports produced by each PSC authority to include:

- PSC data from forty-five countries on five continents
- 651,134 PSC vessel boardings
- 350,943 Safety Examinations
- 12,991 Detentions

8  Ibid.
Appendix D – United States Coast Guard’s Port State Control and Marine Inspection Programs’ Data and Detailed Report

The PSC Average Detention Rate is an average for all three surveyed PSC regimes. It is based upon total number of Safety Examinations and Detentions from each PSC authority, over a six year period.

If the CVDR is above the PSC Average Detention Rate, the CVDR is considered undesirable. A CVDR percent above (or leads) PSCs Detention Rate suggests the qualities of vessels inspected in California on average are substandard compared to vessels inspected in other parts of the United States/world and thus require more vessels to be detained.

Conversely, if the CVDR is below the PSC Average Detention Rate, the CVDR is considered desirable. A CVDR percent below PSCs Detention Rate suggests the quality of vessels inspected in California on average are of a higher standard than vessels inspected in other parts of the United States/world and thus require fewer vessels to be detained.

Findings

A review of the USCG’s electronic notice of arrival data for the calendar year 2015 revealed that 1,888 individual foreign vessels intended to call on California ports in 2015. All ships arriving from a foreign port are required to give ninety-six (96) hours advanced notice of their arrival to the USCG.  

Referencing the USCG’s 2015 PSC Annual Report, the U.S. Coast Guard’s District 11 conducted 1,083 Safety Examination in California. Accordingly, the District 11’s vessel targeting matrix led to a PSC Safety Examination rate of 57.36% of all foreign flag vessels arriving in California.

The below table references Attachment 1 and shows six years of cumulative safety examination and detention data per PSC authority. The Detention Rate can be derived by dividing Detentions by Safety Examinations. “Detention rates are expressed as a percentage of the number of Safety Examinations, rather than the number of individual ships inspected to take account for the fact that some ships may be inspected more than once in a calendar year.”

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11  All ships arriving from a foreign port are required to give ninety-six (96) hours advanced notice of their arrival to the USCG.

Table 1: Six Year Cumulative Inspection and Detention Data per PSC Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSC Authority</th>
<th>Vessel Boardings</th>
<th>Safety Examinations</th>
<th>Detentions</th>
<th>PSC Average Detention Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo MoU</td>
<td>97,637</td>
<td>178,148</td>
<td>8,145</td>
<td>4.5720%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris MoU</td>
<td>89,407</td>
<td>115,399</td>
<td>4,022</td>
<td>3.4853%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG less District 11</td>
<td>417,038</td>
<td>50,619</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>1.4794%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG District 11</td>
<td>47,052</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.1067%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *1.1067% represents the California Vessel Detention Rate (CVDR)

Table 1 reveals that the California Vessel Detention Rate or CVDR is 1.1067%. The CVDR is equal to the USCG District 11 Detention Rate due to fact that all vessel Safety Examinations were conducted in or adjacent to California waters.

Additionally, Table 1 reveals that the CVDR is below the Detention Rate of the other PSCs. A CVDR below the PSC Average Detention Rate is a desirable situation. It indicates the quality of vessels inspected in California on average are of a higher standard than vessels inspected in other parts of the United States/world.
Table 2 compares the California Vessel Detention Rate weighted average against both the domestic and international PSC regimes' weighted average detention rates. Using the California Vessel Detention Rate in this way allows for comparing PSC regimes detention rate both domestically and internationally and enables for the relative assessment as to the condition/quality of vessels calling on California ports.

Table 2: Six Years Weighted Average Detention Rate Computation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSC Authority</th>
<th>No. of Safety Examinations</th>
<th>No. of Detentions</th>
<th>Detention Rate %</th>
<th>Weighting % Based on Detentions*</th>
<th>Detention Rate Weighted Average**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) / (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(D) X (E)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo MoU</td>
<td>178,148</td>
<td>8,145</td>
<td>4.5720%</td>
<td>62.70%</td>
<td>2.8665%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris MoU</td>
<td>115,399</td>
<td>4,022</td>
<td>3.4853%</td>
<td>30.96%</td>
<td>1.0790%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG less D 11</td>
<td>50,619</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>1.4794%</td>
<td>5.77%</td>
<td>0.0854%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D11 (CVDR)</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.1067%</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
<td>0.0064%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>350,943</td>
<td>12,991</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.0374%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSC Detention Rate Weighted Average (W.A) 4.0374%
CVDR W.A. 0.0064%
CVDR W.A. Below PSC Detention Rate W.A. 4.0309%
Percent CVDR W.A. is below PSC Detention Rate W.A. -99.84%***

Notes:
* Calculation is Number of Detentions by a PSC divided by the sum of all PSC Detentions (12,991)
** Calculation is Detention Rate % multiplied by the Weighting %
*** Calculation is 4.0374% less 0.0064% divided by 4.0374%

Assessment - Marine Inspection Program and U.S. Flag Vessels

Much like the USCG’s PSC program has been established to inspect and enforce safety and environmental standards on foreign ships calling on ports in the United States; the USCG’s Marine Inspection Program (MIP) inspects and enforces safety and environmental standards on United States vessels. Though the standards of the PSC program and the MIP may vary in scope, each program functions to meet the same overarching need. That is, to determine that both foreign and domestic vessels comply with the all applicable laws, rules, and regulations relating to safe construction, equipment, manning, and operation and that they are in a seaworthy condition for the services in which they are operate (33 CFR § 1.01-20).
Appendix D – United States Coast Guard’s Port State Control and Marine Inspection Programs’ Data and Detailed Report

Methodology

Essentially, Port State Control authorities that makeup the Paris and Tokyo MoUs act as third party auditors. A PSC inspection (or audit) is an attempt to verify that a vessel, its operator and flag state (the country in which a vessel is registered) meet applicable conventions, safety and environmental standards; thus provides for an independent, unbiased and creditable means to access United States vessels and speaks to the quality and effectiveness of the USCG’s MIP.

Published each year in the Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU Annual Reports, is an updated document entitled, “White, Grey and Black (WGB) List”. The WGB List represents the full spectrum, from quality flag states to flag states with a poor performance that are considered high risk. It is based on the total number of inspections and detentions and is the results from PSC inspections.13 The WGB List reflects the quality of a flag state’s (marine) inspection programs as well as the quality of vessels, and vessel operators.

The White List contains a list of flag states found to be of higher quality and lower risk. Conversely, the Black List contains a list of flag states found to be substandard. Black List flag states are deemed to be of high risk.14 The Gray List is a list of flag states that may be simply described as average, average being considered less than ideal.

From 2010 to 2015 the flag state United States has appeared on the Tokyo MoU’s White List for the past six consecutive years and on Paris MoU for the past four consecutive years. Note, in 2010 and 2011 the flag state United States appeared on Paris MoU’s Gray List.

Expressed differently, from to 2010 to 2015, out of a possible twelve trials15 (six trials in the Tokyo MoU and six trials in the Paris MoU), the flag state United States attained White List, low risk status ten out of twelve trials or 83% of the sample period. From 2012 to 2015 out of a possible eight trials (four trials in the Tokyo MoU and for trials in the Paris MoU) the flag state United States attained White List, low risk status eight out of eight trials or 100% of the sample period.

Conclusion

Many committee members expressed reservations as to the ability of a Harbor Safety Committee to properly conduct an assessment of a federal program such as required by California Senate Bill 414. Yet, The Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor Safety Committee and the Harbor Safety Committee of the San


14 Ibid.

15 According to StatTrek.com, a binomial experiment is a statistical experiment. The experiment consists of set number of repeated trials. Each trial can result in just two possible outcomes, "success" and "failure". The trials are independent; meaning the outcome on one trial does not affect the outcome on other trials. In the case,

“success” defined as a flag state listed on the White List and “failure” defined as flag state not listed on the White List.
Appendix D – United States Coast Guard’s Port State Control and Marine Inspection Programs’ Data and Detailed Report

Francisco Bay Region employed an innovative and streamlined approach to assess the condition of the United States Coast Guard’s port state control program and marine inspection program.

The HSCs utilizing the Detention Rate derived from PSC regimes data was able to quantify the quality of vessels calling on California ports by comparing the California Vessel Detention Rate weighted average against the combined PSC regimes’ detention rate weighted average. Using the California Vessel Detention Rate in this way enables for the relative assessment as to the condition/quality of vessels calling on California ports.

The assessments results were definitive and conclusive. Table 2 shows the California Vessel Detention Rate weighted average at 0.0064% is the lowest of all surveyed PSC organizations. Table 2 also indicates that vessels calling on California are 99.84% less likely to possess the characteristics that would warrant a PSC detention than other parts of the world.

Independent third party audits more commonly referred to as PSC inspections over the last six consecutive years have reflected favorably upon the flag state of United States as well as the condition of the U.S.C.G.’s Marine Inspection Program. During the sample period (2010-2015), the flag state of United States attained White List, low risk status 83% of the time. Moreover, over the past four consecutive years (2012-2015), the flag state United States attained White List, low risk status 100% of the time.

After conscientious and thorough review of the of data presented in this study, including PSC data from forty-five countries on five continents; 651,134 PSC vessel boardings; 350,943 Safety Examinations, 12,991 Detentions the HSCs find the following: The condition of United States vessels 300 GRT and greater, the condition of foreign vessels calling on California ports, the condition of the United States Coast Guard’s Marine Inspection Program and Port State Control program to be adequate.
### Tokyo MoU PSC Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ship Boardings</th>
<th>Safety Examination</th>
<th>Detentions</th>
<th>Detention %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>17,269</td>
<td>31,407</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>3.6712%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>16,761</td>
<td>30,405</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>3.9566%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16,861</td>
<td>31,018</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>4.4974%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>16,439</td>
<td>30,929</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>4.5944%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15,771</td>
<td>28,627</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>5.4564%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14,536</td>
<td>25,762</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>5.4771%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97,637</td>
<td>178,148</td>
<td>8,145</td>
<td>4.5720%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Paris MoU PSC Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ship Boardings</th>
<th>Safety Examination</th>
<th>Detentions</th>
<th>Detention %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>15,246</td>
<td>17,858</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>3.3318%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>15,377</td>
<td>18,430</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>3.3207%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>14,108</td>
<td>17,687</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>3.7768%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14,646</td>
<td>18,308</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>3.6541%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15,268</td>
<td>19,058</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>3.6100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14,762</td>
<td>24,058</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>3.2837%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89,407</td>
<td>115,399</td>
<td>4,022</td>
<td>3.4853%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### USCG (All Districts) PSC Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ship Boardings</th>
<th>Safety Examination</th>
<th>Detentions</th>
<th>Detention %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>73,752</td>
<td>9,265</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>2.1802%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>79,091</td>
<td>9,232</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1.5490%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>83,535</td>
<td>9,394</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1.2881%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>72,309</td>
<td>9,469</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1.1089%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>79,031</td>
<td>10,129</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.9576%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>76,372</td>
<td>9,907</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.5746%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>464,090</td>
<td>57,396</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1.4356%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### USCG District 11 PSC Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ship Boardings</th>
<th>Safety Examination</th>
<th>Detentions</th>
<th>Detention %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7,570</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.2161%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8,113</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.1765%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>8,529</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5907%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7,491</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.2038%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8,212</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.7432%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7,137</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.8072%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47,052</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.1067%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F – Works Cited

*Anchoring Systems and Procedures for Large Tankers.* Published by Witherby for and on behalf of Oil Companies International Marine Forum, 1982.


Appendix F – Works Cited


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"Port State Control in the United States 2010 Annual Report." United States Coast Guard, 2011,

"Port State Control in the United States 2011 Annual Report." United States Coast Guard, 2012,

"Port State Control in the United States 2012 Annual Report." United States Coast Guard, 2013,

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"Port State Control in the United States 2015 Annual Report." United States Coast Guard, 2016,

"PSC Safety Targeting Matrix." United States Coast Guard, Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance,

Senate Bill 414 (Jackson)(Stats. 2015, ch. 609)